Agent Intellect & Possible Intellect
Dear Genna,
It has been some time since I last made either Aristotle or Aquinas my regular reading, but I will try to offer a few remarks. I would first like to clarify some of the terminology. You write, “In the beginning, there was a void.” Certainly I recognize a poetic license in many biblical expressions; I know that this word is sometimes used for the state of things prior to creation, but it implies “something” even if only empty space. Did Aquinas use it? The Church would interpret is as utter nothingness— no matter and nothing of its other self, energy. Aristotle would probably not have spoken of a void in that he believed that immortal mind had an existence apart from its particular incarnations in human beings. You cite the words from Genesis, and here it is God speaking, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.” When doing catechesis I make a distinction between “image” and “likeness”. The former refers to that element of soul that your paper discusses; the latter, to that state of preternatural justification and holiness that was lost by original sin and only restored by Jesus Christ. However, not all authorities are unanimous or careful in making this distinction. I would not make a big deal about it. Again, does Aquinas see the terms as equivocal? It seems that you do when you raise your two questions preferring the word “likeness” to “image”.
The two questions you ask:
1. If human beings are made in the “likeness” (image) of God, what exactly does mankind share with him?
Your paper does a good job of showing how, using Aristotle, Aquinas posits the “agent intellect” as that which in man is imaged after God.
2. Supposing that a likeness (image) does exist between God and man: how could each individual possibly be unique?
I am not as clear in your paper about the element of uniqueness. Maybe it needs some amplification?
Regarding the differences between one soul and another, Aquinas points to the fact that while there is a similarity of essences, a soul is created immediately by God with the existence of a body. The principle of individuation comes into play. The matter (body) gives the soul its own unique natural qualities. Other than material differentiation, another distinction that the souls of men, while similar, are different, is that each person refers to himself as “I” and not “we”. There is no group consciousness. We see ourselves as connected, but we also consider ourselves as individuals.
Quoting Aquinas, “…If the agent intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many agent intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men…,” you write, “Since it is not a separate substance existing outside of man but a power derived from a superior and separate substance, the agent intellect cannot be the same in all.” You are essentially saying, as I did, that the body informs the agent intellect: “Since the senses by which phantasms are derived do inherently belong to each man as an individual, the agent intellect will derive everything uniquely in each individual.” There have been experiments in this area too. One woman had brain damage and could smell colors. The way her senses worked were different from other people. While there is a general uniformity, they are not absolutely the same. Some people can hear all the intricate sounds of a musical piece, others only the louder parts and more decisive notes. Some see colors more brilliantly and others might fail to see some colors at all or see them as something else, as with color blindness. The material internal senses may also be different. What is there about the brain that would fashion one man as an Einstein or a Mozart and another as an ignorant woman on Welfare or even a career employee at Curves?
You also wrote that “God existed alone,” and while this is true, we know that in God there is no real distinction between his essence and existence. Yes, God exists, but he does so in an absolute and infinite fashion. He is the ground of our existence. When God made us in his image, he fashioned us according to himself and suddenly there existed in material creation, a creature that could respond rationally to God with understanding, thankful praise, and faithful love. The properties of soul, knowing and loving, had been imprinted upon us so that, even in our poverty, we might respond to God in kind— a whole level above the plants and animals over which we had been placed as stewards. There is that element of mind or soul that is immortal, and yet it possesses an existential dependence, as does every created thing.
Pivotal to your paper, you define the “possible intellect” and the “agent intellect”. You write: “Using the medieval terms Aquinas uses, these are: (1) the possible intellect, which receives phantasms through the senses from particular sense-experiences; and (2) the agent intellect, which abstracts the universal form from the phantasms in the possible intellect.” This is clear and concise, very good! What we know in this life requires IMAGES [what you call Phantasms], the starting point for all knowledge. It is only when the soul is separated from the body at death that it no longer depends upon the senses and the imagination.
Man’s place in creation is unique. While plants have vegetative souls and animals have sensitive souls, men have rational souls. Here, as you deduced, is how humanity is made in the image of God. The human soul is the substantial form for human beings. Of course, a human person can no more be reduced to a soul than, as materialists would attempt, to define him solely as a mortal body. A person is the complete corporeal-spiritual composite. We can delineate them, but the complete person requires both elements. The body and soul should not be understood as two separate substances, but one. Aquinas, himself, while making every manner of distinction, would reject any kind of strict dualism. But here I depart from the topic of your paper.
Lacking any kind of inborn knowledge, the human intellectual soul must have, as you write, both the power of understanding and the power of sensing. The power of sensing cannot be exercised without the body. While the soul has the power of understanding, it is dependent on sense-knowledge. The fact that the human mind can conceive of that which is not material is proof that the soul itself transcends the restraints of matter. Self-consciousness is a chief characteristic of an immortal mind or soul.
Aquinas spells out the operation of the possible intellect:
1. phantasm (sensible form) perceived through particular senses
2. data is synthesized by a general sense
3. images are conserved by the imagination
4. facts are grasped by the appropriate power “vis cogitativa”
5. power of memory comes into play
It is after this process that the agent intellect gets involved. It is truly the power of understanding, that which we call rational or intellectual cognition. It is dependent on the possible intellect but is of a higher order.
While the senses grasp particular objects, the mind can extrapolate and comprehend universals. It can abstract the form of things; however, we should be quick to note, that unlike Plato and his world of forms, this does not mean that universal concepts have any independent life outside the mind. For instance, all men and women are particularized. We can extract a universal concept, but no such ideal or universal humanity actually exists.
You write that Aristotle is “adamant that the agent intellect is actuality or activity, while the phantasms in the possible intellect are potentiality.” Yes, you are grappling with how that which comes through the senses is extracted as a concept in the agent intellect. You continue: “This power of intellect, the agent intellect, shines on the phantasms in the possible intellect, and abstracts from these particulars to derive the universal forms of the intelligible species.” Again, yes, the active intellect “illumines” the sense image so that the formal elements and those in potency can be grasped. The potential universal element is abstracted and the “species impressa” is produced. The passive intellect reacts to this determination and results in the “species expressa” or the true universal concept. You write: “The senses are absolutely necessary for any kind of understanding of the world around oneself, for the human being is caught between the body and its senses and the immaterial intellect agent which has no organ.” Quite so, there is no storeroom with innate ideas. All concepts are derivative.
It is at this point that you address the question as to what is immortal and eternal. You echo Aquinas, asking “Does Aristotle mean the agent intellect, the possible intellect, or both?”
Obviously, everything is weighted toward the agent intellect as a higher power, but I suspect that Aquinas would argue for the immortality and unity of the complete human soul. He writes that "Since the agent intellect and the possible intellect are united to us as form, we must acknowledge that they pertain to the same essence of the soul" (SHORTER SUMMA, article 87). Thus, the whole intellect which is one with the soul endures. There are important differences between how Aquinas and Aristotle view the mind. Aristotle sees the mind as immortal and eternal; it exists both prior and subsequent to a union with the body. Thus, he would also make a distinction between the human psyche and the immortal mind. Aquinas sees the soul and its powers being immediately created with its infusion into a body. The soul does not pre-exist but it will outlive the body and will not be destroyed by God. While Aquinas as a Christian sees something of the image of God here; Aristotle as a pagan would claim that what we discern in men is no copy, but the immortal mind itself.
Aquinas’ explanation of the union between “the material and the immaterial in the intellect” is important because given a better understanding of the body, today, similar questions are being raised. What is the relationship between the soul and the senses and the “little grey cells” as the fictional Poirot liked to call them, the brain? Materialists would reduce the mind entirely to chemistry and electricity; arguing that self-consciousness is possible for computers and thinking meat. However, Aristotle, as you point out, saw cooperation between the material and the immaterial. You seek to delineate the highest element, that which is truly made in God’s image.
You write: “Because the intellectual soul is moveable and thus imperfect, Aquinas postulates that “above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is moveable, and what is imperfect, always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect.” No doubt you also discern that something of this argumentation flows from his proofs, or rather, ways for the existence of God. God is the First Cause and the Unmoved Mover. All perfections reach in him their eminent degree and are shared with creation only in a finite and dependent manner. God is a perfect Spirit and our souls are fashioned in his image. He has no beginning and no end. We were created in time, but are promised an eternity beyond this world. In God there is no potency and so there can be no passive intellect. Everything is actualized in God. All universals and all particulars are known to him. You write: “This perfect intellect, Aquinas says, is often said to be the agent intellect. ‘But, even supposing the existence of such a separate agent intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in the superior intellect…’ Quoting a passage of the Bible which shockingly parallels Aristotle, Aquinas finishes: ‘…the separate intellect…is God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator…Therefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. Iv. 7, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.’ Thus the intellect, in its imperfection, derives its light or agent intellect from the light of God Himself.” It will be argued that since the agent intellect in men is made in God’s image and derives its light from God, himself, that it must be immaterial and that which has no parts cannot break down, and does not die. The simpler something is— the more perfect it is. This is most true about God and it is so in its own fashion about the soul, although the human soul is dependent upon God for its existence and illumination.
You continue: “On account of this derived intellectual light, man is said to be made in the likeness of God. In human nature there is an uncomfortable marriage of divine intellect and crude bodily sensation.” Again, you are right on the money. However, not only are we speaking about a crude bodily sensation, but a body that can be faulty and even deceived. People can be diagnosed with disturbed minds, not because the intellect itself is defective but because the body itself is out of balance. Hallucinations can result from brain damage and drugs. People are born into the world mentally retarded. Others have defective senses. Can we even begin to imagine the challenge that Helen Keller’s agent intellect suffered to extrapolate enough sense-impressions to make any cognitive sense of things? Interesting sensory deprivation experiments have been conducted with people in flotation isolation tanks. Common reactions to extended stays in such a tank that deprives a person of most sense input are hallucinations, out-of-body experiences, anxiety, and depression, etc. Are you sure you do not want to go into biochemistry? Here is another instance of overlapping between science and philosophy.
You state that “With his way lit by the light of Divine Intellect, St. Thomas Aquinas, arguing from Aristotle, shows the way to understanding the relationship between God and man inherent in man’s ‘likeness’ of God.” I have limited my remarks to a strict appreciation of Aquinas and Aristotle. Certain modern Catholic philosophers and theologians (like Karl Rahner) might detour us into a discussion of the inner matrix of the mind itself and whether or not we know the things we sense or only the images in the mind that are given us by God. Jacques Maritain, an Existential Thomist, talks of a connatural knowledge that takes this notion of divine illumination a step further; it is not rational but works through the obscure affective inclinations, dispositions and mystical experience.
I do not know if my rambling thoughts will be of any help, but here they are. I liked your paper and it might be the kind of thing to show your parents who worry that philosophy might take you away from God and the faith they have given you. St. Thomas Aquinas baptized the thought of Aristotle and helps us all, not only to think clearly, but to maintain the priceless heritage of our faith. Philosophy, if studied correctly, makes the more full understanding of religion and theology possible.
Many blessings,
Father Joe
P.S. It might be easier to read my response if you print it. Peace!


